yepper. - it surely has made a left turn somewhere.
Surprised so many are encouraging the original poster to butt out, assume itās being handled, look the other way, everyone drinks too much, etc.
How do you know this OPM/DCSA investigator did not report his arrest or possibly alcohol treatment, counseling, etc.?? Very few people should be privy to that information and those individuals are bound to keep this information private.
You need to brush up on your CDSE training. Substance abuse and addictive behaviors are an indicator of potential insider threat.Heavy drinkers arenāt generally clear decision makers, especially over long periods of time.
The people who would have first-hand knowledge of any questionable behavior relative to his duties and responsibilities will be within his professional circle of colleagues and supervisors. Concerns of insider threats should be of no concern to outsiders.
My comments are in no way meant to minimize the problem of insider threats, but just the potential problem of outsider Keystone Karens.
The program requires outside monitoring. DCSA (there are no OPM investigators any more) Agents and contractors rarely see each other and often only physically see their supervisor once a year in a controlled, announced, environment.
if you have concerns, report it. If there is nothing new, no harm. If this is unreported, we need to know about it.
How do you know this OPM/DCSA investigator did not report his arrest or possibly alcohol treatment, counseling, etc.?? Very few people should be privy to that information and those individuals are bound to keep this information private.
I have no idea what was or was not reported. The original poster appears to have grave concerns about his investigator friend, writing āI donāt think my friend should be making any character judgements or be in a position where heās trusted.ā He appears to have alcohol issues, criminal issues and financial issues. This is not trivial stuff.
Given these facts I believe the original poster is obliged to relay his concerns, and whatever facts he has (details of the pending alcohol charge, for example) to the relevant DCSA VROC Knowledge Center as noted above. Personnel at that level will take the next steps and the original poster has done his duty.
The people who would have first-hand knowledge of any questionable behavior relative to his duties and responsibilities will be within his professional circle of colleagues and supervisors. Concerns of insider threats should be of no concern to outsiders.
Respectfully, I could not disagree more. Much questionable behavior takes place outside professional circles. The investigatorās supervisor and colleagues - especially if he is a contract investigator, especially in the covid environment - would have no way of knowing about his issues unless he self-reported them. If I were cited for an alcohol offense a few months ago (I was not), it would take time for that information to make its way through the various databases and organizations and reach an actual DCSA employee (or algorithm) that could act on the information.
The claim that this course of misconduct is of āno concern to outsidersā is at variance with every security rule, practice and tenet.
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Keep in mind anyone with a security clearance has Reporting Requirements (SEAD 3 ā page 5, point #3 - Reportable Actions by Others - alcohol abuse is a concern to be reported).
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Go ahead and look at all the case studies in the CDSE website and please reference ONE who was an insider threat due to alcohol use. I am not saying there are not any, but if you can find one, please let us all know. Thanks